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AIMING STRAIGHT:  THE USE OF INDIGENOUS 
CUSTOMARY LAW TO PROTECT TRADITIONAL 
CULTURAL EXPRESSIONS 
Meghana RaoRane† 
Abstract: Globalization has led to the propagation of traditional cultural 
expressions of indigenous peoples outside their communities.  Consequently, the question 
of how these expressions should be protected has acquired heightened significance.  
Commentators have proposed using existing intellectual property regimes and sui generis 
solutions.  This Comment advocates a third solution, the use of indigenous customary 
laws of indigenous peoples to protect their particular traditional cultural expressions. 
Indigenous customary laws ensure effective protection of the traditional cultural 
expressions of indigenous peoples.  The assumption that existing intellectual property 
regimes provide the only available protection is erroneous and constrains the 
development of effective solutions.  Western intellectual property based regimes are 
incompatible with the goals underlying the protection of traditional cultural expressions 
and give rise to ineffectual solutions.  However, indigenous customary law is law, and it 
is satisfactorily being used by communities to protect their expressions.  It is a flexible 
solution in that communities can apply their particular customary laws to protect their 
cultural expressions.  This Comment concedes that the application of indigenous 
customary laws will encounter challenges related to implementation.  However, a true 
desire to protect the traditional cultural expressions of indigenous peoples can fuel the 
discovery of viable solutions. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1980, John Bulun Bulun, an Australian Aboriginal artist, created a 
painting titled Magpie Geese and Waterlilies at the Waterhole.1  The painting 
incorporated images sacred to his clan (the Ganalbingu people),2 and he 
created it with the clan’s consent and according to its traditional laws and 
customs.3  Under Ganalbingu customary law,4 Mr. Bulun Bulun could use 
his artwork in restricted ways depending on the mode and purpose of 
                                           
†
 I would like to thank Professor Joel Ngugi for his invaluable guidance and Jonathan Franklin and 
the staff of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for their advice and direction throughout this process.  I 
would especially like to thank my husband Reza Behforooz for his unfailing support, my parents for their 
endless confidence in me, and without whom this endeavor would never have begun, and my sisters for 
their love and encouragement. 
1
 Terri Janke, Minding Culture: Case-Studies on Intellectual Property and Traditional Cultural 
Expressions, Case Study 3, at 51-52 (2003), available at http://wipo.int/tk/en/studies/cultural/minding-
culture/studies/finalstudy.pdf .   
2
 The Ganalbingu people live traditional lifestyles on land near the Arafura Swamp, which is 
situated in Arhem Land in the Northern Territory of Australia.  See MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS 
NATIVE CULTURE 44 (2003); see also IDIDJ Australia, A Flower in the Swamp – the Life of Daphne 
Danyawarra, http://www.ididj.com.au/education/profiles/banyawarra.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2006). 
3
 Janke, supra  note 1, at 51. 
4
 This Comment argues in Part V.B. that indigenous customary law is indeed law. 
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reproduction.5  Accordingly, he sold the painting to the Maningrida Arts and 
Crafts Centre, which resold it to the Northern Territory Museum of Arts and 
Science.6  Mr. Bulun Bulun also gave his permission to reproduce the 
painting in a book about Australia’s living heritage.7  Roughly eight years 
later, he learned that a modified version of his painting8 had been 
incorporated into some fabric.9  The fabric, which was to be used to make 
uniforms, was produced without his consent.10   
As a result, Mr. Bulun Bulun and a high ranking Ganalbingu member 
(on behalf of the clan) sued the textile company that had produced the 
fabric.11  Mr. Bulun Bulun claimed that the textile company had infringed 
his copyright in the painting under Australia’s Copyright Act of 1968.12  The 
clan on the other hand claimed that it was the equitable owner of the 
copyright in the painting, or alternatively, that the artist’s copyright created 
fiduciary obligations in favor of the clan.13  Mr. Bulun Bulun obtained 
injunctions to prevent future infringement of his work because the 
defendants admitted to breaching his copyright.14  However, the clan’s claim 
was dismissed.15  The clan argued that the Ganalbingu people “are the 
traditional owners of the body of ritual knowledge from which the artistic 
work is derived, including the subject matter of the artistic work and the 
artistic work itself.”16  According to the clan, the painting depicted sacred17 
knowledge concerning one of the two most important cultural sites for the 
Ganalbingu people, located in Ganalbingu country.18  Moreover, under 
Ganalbingu customary law, the ownership of the land was tied to a 
responsibility to create accompanying cultural expressions.19  Although Mr. 
Bulun Bulun was entrusted by his clan with the sacred duty to create 
images,20 the unauthorized reproduction and misuse of the artwork interfered 
with the relationship among the Ganalbingu people, their ancestors, and 
                                           
5
 See Janke, supra note 1, at 56.  
6
 See id. at 51. 
7
 Id.   
8
 See id. 
9
 See id. at 53. 
10
 See id. 
11
 Id. at 51. 
12
 See Bulun Bulun v. R & T Textiles Pty Ltd. (1998) 86 F.C.R. 244-246. 
13
 Id. 
14
 See id.  
15
 See Janke, supra note 1, at 51-53. 
16
 Id. at 54. 
17
 See BROWN, supra note 2, at 44-45. 
18
 See Janke, supra note 1, at 54. 
19
 See id. at 54. 
20
 BROWN, supra note 2, at 44. 
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their land, and threatened the stability of their society.21  In addition, the 
image had certain secret aspects to it, which necessitated controlling its 
reproduction.  Mr. Bulun Bulun explained that his painting “has all the 
inside [secret] meaning of our ceremony, law and custom encoded in it. . . . 
To produce [the painting] without strict observance of the law governing its 
production diminishes its importance and interferes adversely with the 
relationship and trust established between myself, my ancestors, and Barnda 
[the long-neck tortoise, a creator being].”22  Thus, the clan suffered harm as 
a result of the infringement.  In dismissing the clan’s complaint, the court 
found that the clan and the artist did not share an equitable interest in the 
painting because they were not joint authors as required by Australian 
copyright law.23  However, the court found that a fiduciary duty did exist 
between the artist and the clan, and if the artist had failed to protect the 
work, the clan could have brought legal action against the textile company.24  
Because Mr. Bulun Bulun had taken action to protect the painting, in this 
case, the clan had no need for a remedy.25     
Cases such as Mr. Bulun Bulun’s raise important questions regarding 
the intellectual property rights of indigenous peoples26 with respect to 
expressions of their traditional culture.  Issues surrounding the adequate 
protection of traditional cultural expressions (“TCEs”)27 have been raised in 
Australia and around the world.28  Some resultant questions include whether 
communities own the cultural expressions, whether the cultural expressions 
should be owned at all, and if so, how they can best be protected.  As the 
Bulun Bulun case illustrates, there are gaping holes in the protections 
afforded to TCEs by existing Intellectual Property Regimes (“IPRs”).  
Disciplines such as copyright, trademark, and trade secret have failed to 
provide adequate protection to TCEs.  Australia, a country with a large 
indigenous population, has confronted these issues, and has taken a leading 
stance in their resolution.  Australian courts have tried hard to bridge the gap 
between the needs of indigenous peoples and the protections current laws 
afford their TCEs. 
                                           
21
 Janke, supra note 1, at 56. 
22
 BROWN, supra note 2, at 54. 
23
 See id. at 63-64. 
24
 See id. at 64. 
25
 See id. at 64-65. 
26
 See infra Part II.A for an explanation of the term “indigenous peoples.”  
27
 See infra Part II.B for an explanation of the term “traditional cultural expressions.”  
28
 See generally BROWN, supra note 2. 
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This Comment argues that the mainstream solutions proposed for the 
protection of TCEs, namely the use of existing IPRs and sui generis29 
solutions, are sub-optimal, and the indigenous customary laws of the 
communities seeking protection are more effective and should be 
implemented instead.  This proposal is especially relevant in the Australian 
context given that Australia has led the way in dealing with the concerns of 
indigenous communities30 and is more likely to consider the adoption of 
indigenous customary law in some form as a solution.  Thus, although the 
issues presented are relevant to indigenous communities across the world, 
this Comment uses the Australian experience as a springboard for its 
proposal.  Part II of this Comment introduces the terms “indigenous 
peoples” and TCEs.  It also describes certain attributes of TCEs that impact 
their protection.  Part III relates the mechanisms proposed for the protection 
of TCEs in mainstream literature and addresses their limitations, and Part IV 
presents significant developments relevant to TCEs in Australian law. 
Consequently, Part V of this Comment argues that the application of 
indigenous customary law is the ideal mechanism for the protection of 
TCEs.  Indigenous customary law is indeed law, and it has been used 
effectively to provide the types of protections indigenous peoples desire.  
However, the mainstream approaches proposed for the protection of TCEs 
are based upon the occidental notion that existing IPRs exhaust all means of 
providing protection.  This notion is fallacious and limiting, and does not 
account for the differences between TCEs and other forms of intellectual 
property.  It leads to solutions that over-reach or under-reach in the 
protections they afford, resulting in an ultimate denial of protection.  
Accordingly, the ideal way to protect the TCEs of indigenous peoples is to 
travel outside the epistemic discourse produced by the occidental intellectual 
property regime and allow for a form of protection that has worked for 
indigenous communities—the enforcement of the indigenous customary 
laws that have always governed the fate of their TCEs.  Part VI of this 
Comment argues that the challenges of effectively implementing indigenous 
customary law are no more difficult to surmount than those encountered in 
the implementation of other regimes of protection.  Finally, Part VI also puts 
forth some solutions to the implementation-related concerns.  
                                           
29
 Defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as “Of its own kind or class; unique or particular.”  BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1448 (7th ed. 1999). 
30
 See, e.g., Mabo v. Queensland II (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1; see also discussion infra Part IV (providing  
an overview of Australian law in this regard). 
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II. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ TCES ARE THEIR LIVING CULTURAL HERITAGE 
AND PRESENT UNIQUE PROBLEMS FOR PROTECTION 
Widely accepted definitions for the terms “indigenous peoples” and 
“TCEs” do not exist, and yet, there are certain commonalities among the 
existing definitions which provide an adequate basis for understanding them.  
Indigenous peoples are the living descendents of the pre-invasion inhabitants 
of lands now dominated by others and who were subject to some form of a 
colonizing experience.31  TCEs, on the other hand, constitute all forms of the 
living and evolving cultural creations of a community, and possess certain 
attributes that raise unique issues regarding their protection.32 
A. The Term “Indigenous Peoples” Is Highly Debated Upon, but 
Encompasses Certain Undisputed Aspects 
“Indigenous peoples” refers “broadly to the [culturally distinctive 
communities of the] living descendants of preinvasion inhabitants of lands 
now dominated by others.”33  This Comment adopts the above definition 
because it is fairly expansive.  The attempt to define indigenous peoples has 
been controversial.34  Some states have challenged the need for a definition, 
while others have found it necessary.35  Indigenous people themselves have 
expressed concerns regarding the idea of a formal definition for fear of 
excluding groups that are not encompassed by the definition.36  In addition, 
there has been debate about the use of the term “peoples” due to its 
association with the right of self-determination.37  Regardless, bodies like 
the United Nations, the International Labor Organization, and the World 
                                           
31
 See S. James Anaya, International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: The Move Toward the  
Multicultural State, 21 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 13, 13 (2004). 
32
 See generally Kamal Puri, Protection of Traditional Culture and Folklore, 
http://www.folklife.si.edu/resources/Unesco/puri.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2006) (discussing “folklore” and 
the current regimes available for its protection). 
33
 See S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2004). 
34
 See Peter-Tobias Stoll & Anja von Hahn, Indigenous Peoples, Indigenous Knowledge and 
Indigenous Resources in International Law, in INDIGENOUS HERITAGE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:  
GENETIC RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE, 5, 8-9 (Silke von Lewinski ed., 2004); 
see also Jeremy Firestone & Jonathan Lilley, Isabel Torres de Noronha, Cultural Diversity, Human Rights, 
and the Emergence of Indigenous Peoples in International and Comparative Law, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 
219, 223-231 (2005) (examining the term “indigenous peoples” and discussing their relevance in 
international environmental law). 
35
 See Stoll & von Hahn, supra note 34, at 8; see also Benedict Kingsbury, “Indigenous Peoples” in 
International Law: A Constructivist Approach to the Asian Controversy, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 414 (1998) 
(discussing controversies surrounding the term “indigenous”). 
36
 Stoll & von Hahn, supra note 34, at 8-9; see Kingsbury, supra note  35, at 421-424. 
37
 Stoll & von Hahn, supra note 34, at 12. 
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Bank38 have attempted to formulate a definition.  Although all the definitions 
differ from each other, certain commonalities exist—such as cultural 
distinctiveness, self-identification, the experience of subjugation, and an 
occupation of the land prior to outside settlers—that are significant to an 
understanding the term “indigenous peoples.”39  In Australia, the term refers 
primarily to the Aboriginal people of the mainland who arrived from 
Southeast Asia and have lived in Australia for at least forty thousand years.40  
It also refers to the Torres Strait Islanders who arrived at the Torres Strait 
Islands more recently, probably from Papua New Guinea.41   
B. The Term “Traditional Cultural Expressions” Is Expansive and It 
Constitutes the Living Cultural Heritage of Indigenous Peoples 
The terms “traditional cultural expressions”, “expressions of 
folklore,” “indigenous culture,” and “intangible and tangible cultural 
heritage,” are all used to refer to the traditional cultural creations of a 
community, notwithstanding a debate on their propriety and validity.42  Since 
the term TCE is free of any negative connotations other terms may imply43 
and is used by the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”),44 this 
Comment will refer to the subject matter constituting the traditional cultural 
creations of indigenous peoples as TCEs.  No single, widely accepted 
definition of TCEs exists,45 and despite valid concerns over the lack of a 
                                           
38
 See id. at 9-11. 
39
 See id. at 11; see also Working Paper by the Chairperson-Rapporteur, Mrs. Erica-Irene A. Daes, 
on the Concept of "Indigenous People," Sub Committee on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities, 14th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1996/2 (1996) (discussing factors relevant to the 
understanding of the concept of “indigenous”). 
40
 See Justice Ronald Sackville, Legal Protection of Indigenous Culture in Australia, 11 CARDOZO J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 711, 713-714 (2003).  
41
 See id.  
42
 Consolidated Analysis of the Legal Protection of Traditional Cultural Expressions, at Annex 2, 
Annex 17, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/3 (May 2, 2003), available at http://www.wipo.int/documents/ 
en/meetings/2003/igc/pdf/grtkf_ic_5_3.pdf; see also Michael Blakeney, Intellectual Property in the 
Dreamtime—Protecting the Cultural Creativity of Indigenous Peoples, OIPRC ELECTRONIC J. INTELL. 
PROP. RTS. Section 1(a) (1999), http://www.oiprc.ox.ac.uk/EJWP1199.pdf. 
43
 The term “folklore” in particular has been criticized for implying an association with less 
developed societies and for its seemingly copyright-centric and Western bias.  See Global Intellectual 
Property Rights: Boundaries of Access and Enforcement, Panel II: The Law and Policy of Protecting 
Folklore, Traditional Knowledge, and Genetic Resources, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
753, 757 (2002); see also Agnes Lucas-Schloetter, Folklore, in INDIGENOUS HERITAGE AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY: GENETIC RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE 259, 262 (Silke von 
Lewinski ed., 2004). 
44
 Consolidated Analysis of the Legal Protection of Traditional Cultural Expressions, supra note 42, 
at Annex 18.  
45
 See id. at Annex 17-18. 
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consistent definition,46 the existing definitions, being sufficiently 
expansive,47 will suffice for this Comment.  For example, a working 
description of TCEs set forth by the WIPO and the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”) Model 
Provisions recognizes them as “productions consisting of characteristic 
elements of the traditional artistic heritage developed and maintained by a 
community . . . or by individuals reflecting traditional artistic expectations of 
such a community.”48 
In addition, the Model Provisions encompass four types of 
expressions that are considered TCEs:49  1) verbal expressions (folktales, 
folk poetry and riddles), 2) musical expressions (folksongs and instrumental 
music), 3) expressions by actions (dances, plays and artistic forms or 
rituals), and 4) tangible expressions (productions of various types of folk art, 
crafts, musical instruments, and architectural forms).  Various other 
definitions constructed in the same expansive vein abound, and some are 
country-specific.50  A noteworthy characteristic of TCEs is that they are 
living and constantly evolving.51  The story underlying Mr. Bulun Bulun’s 
artwork constitutes a TCE as it is a manifestation of a form of traditional 
culture, contains elements of the artistic heritage of the Ganalbingu people, 
and is living and evolving due to its continued significance and application 
within the community.   
C. Traditional Cultural Expressions Have Certain Distinct Attributes that 
Raise Unique Issues with Respect to Their Protection 
Certain attributes of TCEs distinguish them from other expressions of 
culture and raise unique issues regarding their protection.  TCEs are based 
on traditions, associated with indigenous groups, and may be practiced in a 
traditional manner.52  They are usually conveyed orally, visually, by 
                                           
46
 See Lucy M. Moran, Intellectual Property Law Protection for Traditional and Sacred “Folklife 
Expressions”: Will Remedies Become Available to Cultural Authors and Communities, 6 U. BALT. INTELL. 
PROP. L.J. 99, 101 (1998).    
47
 See Jonathan Blavin, Folklore in Africa, section I, Jan. 8, 2003, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/ 
openeconomies/okn/folklore.html. 
48
 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org. (UNESCO)/World Intell. Prop. Org. 
(WIPO), Model Provisions for National Laws on the Protection of Expressions of Folklore Against Illicit 
Exploitation and Other Prejudicial Actions 9-10 (1985). 
49
 Id.  
50
 See, e.g., Paul Kuruk, Protecting Folklore Under Modern Intellectual Property Regimes: A 
Reappraisal of the Tensions Between Individual and Communal Rights in Africa and the United States, 48 
AM. U. L. REV. 769, 778 (1999). 
51
 Puri, supra note 32, at Introduction. 
52
 Consolidated Analysis of the Legal Protection of Traditional Cultural Expressions, supra note 42, 
at Annex 18-19. 
834 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 15 NO. 3 
 
 
imitation, or in performance, implying that the written tradition is less 
significant for TCEs.53  The ownership rights of TCEs are based on 
communal notions, where the community owns the cultural expressions 
passed down by its ancestors, and no individual member has the authority to 
alienate them.54  Certain forms of TCEs passed down over generations may 
be used by individuals in the community in creative ways, leading to a 
“dynamic interplay between collective and individual creativity” and the 
production of countless variations of the TCE.55  Thus, although the 
expressions of TCEs may be tangible, intangible, or a combination of the 
two, the underlying traditional culture is usually intangible, and a separation 
of the two aspects has been compared to a separation of the body and the 
soul, and is artificial.56  In addition, TCEs are based on traditions that have 
existed for long periods of time, often longer than the terms of protections 
offered by existing IPRs.  Thus, questions arise regarding whether they 
should receive legal protection at all.57  Certain forms of TCEs are 
considered sacred by the communities in which they exist, and knowledge of 
them by those unauthorized to know, as well as use of the knowledge in an 
unauthorized manner, leads to their desecration.58  Finally, TCEs can be 
misappropriated59 and serve as fodder for artistic inspiration to people 
outside the indigenous community, resulting in imitation and misuse of the 
culture.60 
III. MAINSTREAM SOLUTIONS PROPOSED FOR THE PROTECTION OF TCES 
ARE INADEQUATE  
Most efforts to protect TCEs have tended toward using existing IPRs 
and sui generis solutions.  Although these solutions at first glance seem 
capable of adequately protecting TCEs, there are severe limitations inherent 
in them, and as such, they fail to constitute satisfactory solutions. 
                                           
53
 Puri, supra note 32, at Introduction. 
54
 See Blavin, supra note 47, at section II.A. 
55
 WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. (“WIPO”), The Protection of Traditional Cultural 
Expressions/Expressions of Folklore: Revised Objectives and Principles, at Annex 13, WIPO Doc. 
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/8/4, (Apr. 8, 2005), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo_grtkf_ic_8/wipo_ 
grtkf_ic_8_4.pdf. 
56
 See Consolidated Analysis of the Legal Protection of Traditional Cultural Expressions, supra note 
42, at Annex 18. 
57
 See id. at 7. 
58
 Brown, supra note 2, at 54. 
59
 See Rebecca Tsosie, Reclaiming Native Stories: An Essay on Cultural Appropriation and Cultural 
Rights, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 299, 310-11 (2002). 
60
 Consolidated Analysis of the Legal Protection of Traditional Cultural Expressions, supra note 42, 
at Annex 19. 
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A. Existing Intellectual Property Regimes Provide Inadequate Protection 
Existing IPRs are well developed, and yet, they fail to satisfactorily 
protect TCEs.  The laws that constitute existing IPRs are flexible and apply 
to a wide range of issues.  However, they fall short of protecting TCEs due 
to their multiple requirements and misaligned foundations relative to TCEs. 
1. The Numerous and Incompatible Requirements of Copyright Law 
Limit Its Ability to Protect TCEs 
The philosophical premise underlying copyright law, one existing IPR 
proposed as a solution to protect TCEs, has been described as utilitarian, 
where the “purpose of copyright is to stimulate production of the widest 
possible variety of creative goods at the lowest possible price.”61  Copyright 
law is associated with the common law world and can trace its roots to 
England.62  The Crown wanted to control the first printing establishment 
founded in 1476, for both economic and political reasons.63  It thus granted 
exclusive rights to some to publish certain books.64  Years later in 1709, the 
Statute of Anne was enacted.65  It was the world’s first copyright statute and 
was entitled, “An Act of the Encouragement of Learning, by vesting the 
Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during 
the Times therein mentioned.”66  It gave the Stationers, the group that held 
monopoly over publishing at that time, the continued right to destroy 
unauthorized and unlicensed works, while entitling anyone to obtain a 
copyright for a limited term.67  Thus, the Act “encouraged learning” by 
providing authors or publishers limited term copyrights.68  Similarly, in 
France, sovereign printing privileges existed, but they ended with the French 
revolution.69  Laws were passed in 1791 and 1793 which gave authors rights 
in their works.70  The English and French laws formed the basis of future 
copyright laws and thus fixed the rights of economic exploitation.71  Other 
nations then began developing their own copyright laws.72  Australian 
                                           
61
 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE 3 (2001). 
62
 See id.  
63
 See id. at 5. 
64
 See id. 
65
 1 Paul Edward Geller, International Copyright Law and Practice § 2. 
66
 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 61, at 5. 
67
 See id. at 5-6. 
68
 See id.  
69
 Id. at 8. 
70
 See id.  
71
 See GELLER, supra note 65, at §2. 
72
 See generally id. (discussing the historical rise of copyright).  
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copyright law is based on the copyright law of England.73  When the United 
Kingdom (“UK”) enacted a new copyright act in 1911, Australia adopted it 
by passing the Copyright Act of 1912.74  Today, Australian copyright law is 
governed by The Copyright Act of 1968.75  It too was influenced by the 
copyright laws of the UK, specifically, the 1956 UK Act.76  Thus historically, 
economic and property development, as well as the cultural development of 
the state, have been the predominant considerations in the formation of 
copyright law.77  Economic rights and protections have been given to authors 
in exchange for the creation of intellectual works that will eventually fall 
into the public domain, thereby enriching the state’s cultural heritage.78  
Therefore, the purpose of copyright is to balance the author’s rights against 
the state’s goal of disseminating intellectual creations.79   
This common underlying purpose of copyright law results in certain 
basic criteria for copyright protection which can be generalized despite the 
differing copyright laws across nations.  All copyright laws require some 
form of creativity or originality to prevent the slavish copying of works.80  
Additional requirements, such as “skill and knowledge,” “nontrivial 
variation,” “the imprint of personality,” or “individuality,” may also be 
applied.81  Some copyright laws require works to be fixed in a tangible form, 
while others presuppose works to be embodied in a perceptible form, and do 
not require fixation.82  Rights to control derivative works also exist.83  
Finally, in most countries, works can be protected for limited terms only.84 
Due to the requirements copyright law imposes and its underlying 
premises, copyright law cannot adequately protect TCEs.  First, copyright 
                                           
73
 See generally COPYRIGHT LAW REVIEW COMMITTEE, CROWN COPYRIGHT 20-24 (2005), available 
at http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(CFD7369FCAE9B8F32F341DBE097801FF)~6+ 
APRIL+full+version+crown+copyright.pdf/$file/6+APRIL+full+version+crown+copyright.pdf (discussing 
the development of copyright law in Australia). 
74
 See id. at 22-23. 
75
 See Attorney General’s Office, Copyright Law in Australia 5, http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/ 
rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(CFD7369FCAE9B8F32F341DBE097801FF)~Copyright+Law+in+Australia+-+A+ 
Short+Guide+-+June+2005.pdf/$file/Copyright+Law+in+Australia+-+A+Short+Guide+-+June+2005.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 13, 2006). 
76
 See, e.g., COPYRIGHT LAW REVIEW COMMITTEE, supra note 73, at 23-24. 
77
 See Cathryn A. Berryman, Toward More Universal Protection of Intangible Cultural Property, 1 
J. INTELL. PROP. L. 293, 297-98 (1994). 
78
 See id. 
79
 Angela R. Riley, Recovering Collectivity: Group Rights to Intellectual Property in Indigenous 
Communities, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 175, 185 (2000). 
80
 GELLER, supra note 65, § 2[c][i]. 
81
 Id. 
82
 Id. 
83
 Id. 
84
 See generally GOLDSTEIN, supra note 61, at 230-236. 
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law is based on the concept of individuality, and it confers rights on 
individual and joint authors.85  However, due to the constantly evolving 
nature of TCEs, attribution to individual or joint authors within indigenous 
communities is not possible.86  Moreover, ownership rights in indigenous 
communities are complex and nuanced,87 and indigenous authors are subject 
to complex communal regulations.88  The court in Bulun Bulun 
acknowledged these intricate rights, as explained in Mr. Bulun Bulun’s 
affidavit which stated that:  
I am permitted by my law to create this artwork, but it is also 
my duty and responsibility to create such words, as part of my 
traditional Aboriginal land ownership obligation.  A painting 
such as this is not separate from my rights in my land.  It is a 
part of my bundle of rights in the land and must be produced in 
accordance with Ganalbingu custom and law.89 
Similarly, another Australian Aboriginal artist whose artwork had been 
misappropriated explained: 
As an artist whilst I may own the copyright in a particular 
artwork under western law, under Aboriginal law I must not use 
an image or story in such a way as to undermine the rights of all 
the other Yolngu (her clan) who have an interest whether direct 
or indirect in it.  In this way I hold the image on trust for all the 
other Yolngu with an interest in the story.90 
Thus, indigenous authors do not own their creations in the ways that Western 
authors do.  Yet, Western notions of individual and joint authorship continue 
to exist as preconditions to copyright protection, and as a result, indigenous 
peoples cannot adequately protect their TCEs using copyright law.   
Second, copyright law provides a limited duration for protection.91  
Many TCEs have existed and evolved for many generations.92  Because 
copyright law provides protection for only a limited period, it cannot 
                                           
85
 See Silke von Lewinski, The Protection of Folklore, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 747, 757 
(2003). 
86
 See id. at 757-758.  
87
 See, e.g., PETER SUTTON, NATIVE TITLE IN AUSTRALIA: AN ETHNOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVE, 111-34 
(2003) (highlighting the complexity of Aboriginal land title, which is inextricably entwined with the TCEs 
of Aboriginal peoples in Australia). 
88
 See WIPO, supra note 42, at Annex 36. 
89
 Bulun Bulun, supra note 12, at 250. 
90
 See Milpurrurru v. Indofurn Pty. Ltd. and Others (1994) 54 F.C.R. 240. 
91
 See von Lewinski, supra note 85, at 759. 
92
 See Sackville, supra note 40, at 725-26. 
838 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 15 NO. 3 
 
 
adequately protect the long lasting and continuously evolving TCEs.93  
Third, copyright law requires some form of originality.94  Because TCEs 
have existed for long periods of time and have likely already fallen into the 
public domain, the small changes they are subject to as a result of their 
evolution are not likely to fulfill the originality requirement.95  Fourth, some 
countries require “fixation” of the material sought to be protected.96  Even 
when the culture is “fixed” in a form adequate to meet the copyright 
requirements, which may not always occur, because TCEs constantly evolve, 
newer forms or versions not yet fixed will not be eligible for protection.97  
Therefore, copyright law either imposes very narrow requirements or does 
not impose any requirements in areas where TCEs need protection.  
2. Trade Secret Law Cannot Protect TCEs Because of Its Commercial 
Basis  
Trade secret law, another mainstream IPR proposed as a solution for 
protecting TCEs, attempts to protect valuable commercial information that 
has been conveyed in confidence.98  A trade secret is a piece of information 
that has commercial value, is necessary to carry out the business of the 
organization, and is conveyed to employees or others in confidence.99  The 
owner of the trade secret is required to have made reasonable efforts to 
protect it.100  However, trade secrets may be protected indefinitely.101 
Despite its seemingly expansive range of protection, trade secret law 
cannot satisfactorily protect TCEs of indigenous peoples.  At first glance, 
this body of law may be considered useful to protect sacred or secret 
TCEs.102  However, it requires that the information protected be of a 
commercial nature, which is not always the case with TCEs.  Moreover, it 
only protects information so long as it is not already public, and many TCEs 
do not meet this criterion.103  Finally, it provides remedies only once the 
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secret has been disclosed.  Many TCEs are secret and sacred and their very 
disclosure to the uninitiated violates their sanctity.104  Therefore, providing a 
remedy after the expression has been disclosed and the damage done does 
not satisfactorily protect the TCE. 
3. Trademarks, Certification Marks, Geographic Indicators Provide 
Limited Protections and Cannot Protect TCEs 
Trademark law, the third mainstream IPR proposed to protect TCEs, 
identifies the source of goods, and protects commercial investment in 
symbols, names, and other indicators of source.105  Other protective marks 
with similar functions also exist.  Collective trademarks identify the source 
of products or services of the members of a group.106  Certification marks 
guarantee that the associated product or service has certain qualities,107 while 
geographic indicators identify the territory from which a product originates, 
and indicate the existence of a characteristic associated with that territory.108  
Thus, trademarks, certification marks, and geographic indicators serve as a 
stamp of authenticity and an indicator of source for consumers. 
While these marks can provide some valuable protections for TCEs, 
they cannot provide the thorough protection TCEs require.  Although 
trademarks and geographic indicators serve well as indicators of source and 
authenticity, the protections they provide do not extend to the actual 
expression of the TCEs.109  Similarly, certifications marks suffer from this 
same limitation of trademarks and geographic indicators.  In addition, the 
effective use of these marks by indigenous groups is barred by practical 
limitations such as the financial investment involved and a lack of 
knowledge of how to best use them.110 
B. Sui Generis Solutions Are More Progressive in the Protections They 
Provide but Still Have Implicit Limitations 
Sui generis solutions are approaches that create new intellectual 
property categories for the protection of TCEs.111  They aim to protect TCEs 
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by working in conjunction with existing IPRs or by replacing them.112  
Although most countries have created and implemented sui generis solutions 
within their copyright laws, some have established them as stand-alone 
IP-like systems.113  Some sui generis solutions recognize and incorporate 
indigenous customary laws within their mechanisms of protection.114  
Examples of sui generis systems include the Tunis Model Law on Copyright, 
the Model Provisions, the Bangui Agreement of OAPI, the Panama Law No. 
20, and the South Pacific Model Law for National Laws.115   
Although sui generis solutions afford greater protections to TCEs 
when compared with existing IPRs, they still fall short of providing an 
adequate level of protection.  Some sui generis solutions take a step in the 
right direction by incorporating indigenous customary laws, and thus, 
recognize the ability of indigenous customary laws to provide adequate 
protection to TCEs.116  However, as discussed below, sui generis solutions 
are based on existing IPRs, and therefore suffer from many of the same 
limitations of existing IPRs.117  It has also been suggested that sui generis 
solutions have no more than a regional reach and that the WIPO-UNESCO 
Model Provision, for instance, has become “de-facto, a strictly regional 
instrument.”118  
IV. AUSTRALIA HAS TAKEN A PROGRESSIVE APPROACH TO THE 
PROTECTION OF TCES  
While colonial Australia did little to protect indigenous peoples’ 
rights,119 the country has made significant changes through its developing 
body of indigenous law.120  The government has paid attention to the issue of 
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indigenous rights for at least the last twenty years through the establishment 
of committees and working groups and by commissioning various reports to 
deal with the concerns of indigenous peoples.121  However, the development 
of Australian case law with respect to indigenous peoples’ rights has been 
significant.  In this regard, the Mabo122 decision of the Australian High Court 
is an especially momentous one in the development of indigenous rights in 
Australia.123   
In contrast with the United States, where the colonizers entered into 
treaties with the Native Americans, British colonial powers in Australia 
considered the land uninhabited, with no prior claims other than their 
own.124  Therefore, the issue of treaties is connected to the question of land 
title,125 which in turn has significant implications with respect to cultural 
expressions.126  In Mabo, the Australian High Court overturned a law that 
extinguished native land titles in the Torres Strait Islands on the grounds that 
the traditional owners had a “compelling common law claim to their land by 
right of ancestral occupation.”127  As a result, the government has the burden 
of proof to show that there are no prior occupants on land it claims or that 
the traditional occupants have abandoned the land.128  The case was 
significant in many ways, one of which was that the court acknowledged that 
indigenous laws and customs gave rise to native title, and thus native laws 
and customs were part of Australian Law.129   
A sampling of other Australian cases illustrates the courts’ trend of 
acknowledging indigenous customary law.  In Foster v. Mountford,130 the 
court restricted publication of a book it deemed “magnificent” because the 
Aboriginal people whose sacred and confidential information was presented 
in the book (and had been shared with the author in confidence) would suffer 
damage if the uninitiated became privy to the information contained 
within.131  In Yumbulul v. Reserve Bank,132 an Aboriginal artist’s design of a 
Morning Star Pole was reproduced on a banknote.  The court, among other 
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things, observed that current law may be inadequate to recognize the claims 
of aboriginal communities to regulate the use of works that are “essentially 
communal in origin.”133  Finally, in the Bulun Bulun case discussed 
previously, the court opened up the possibility that the creation of an express 
trust between an artist and his or her community, or a third party’s knowing 
involvement in a copyright owners breach of fiduciary duty towards his or 
her community, might allow the community to succeed against a third party 
for copyright infringement.134  Thus, Australian courts have recognized the 
interests of indigenous communities and the lack of adequate safeguards to 
protect their culture, while identifying possible means of protection in future 
cases. 
These developments indicate that Australia has begun to acknowledge 
indigenous customary law in a significant manner.  Although indigenous 
customary law has not yet been directly applied to protect TCEs in 
Australian courts, it is being given serious consideration as a possible basis 
for protection.  Australian courts have acknowledged that under the right 
circumstances, the application of indigenous customary law might indeed be 
appropriate.  Therefore, the leap from where the law is today to the 
application of indigenous customary law for the protection of TCEs might 
not be a very large one. 
V. INDIGENOUS CUSTOMARY LAWS SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED BECAUSE, 
UNLIKE OTHER REGIMES, THEY PROVIDE EFFECTIVE PROTECTION 
The preceding discussion shows that existing IPRs provide ineffective 
resolutions to the problem of protecting TCEs; therefore, another solution—
the application of indigenous customary law135 of indigenous peoples—
should be implemented.  The application of indigenous customary law is the 
most effective resolution, given the inadequacies of solutions based on 
incompatible Western ideals of intellectual property protection.  The 
assumption that existing IPRs alone can protect intellectual property is 
erroneous and ultimately constrains the solutions proposed for protecting 
TCEs.  Indigenous customary law is law that has been used satisfactorily by 
indigenous peoples.136  It is a flexible solution, in that the indigenous 
customary law of each diverse indigenous group around the world can be 
applied to that group to protect its own TCEs.  Mainstream solutions 
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(existing IPRs and sui generis solutions) are based on a Western intellectual 
property paradigm which fundamentally differs from the notions underlying 
the need to protect TCEs.  This causes mainstream solutions to either over-
reach or under-reach in the protections they afford, leading to a denial of 
protection for TCEs.  Thus, they are sub-optimal as solutions, and the 
application of indigenous customary law is a more effective resolution.   
A. The Presumption that Existing IPRs Exhaust All Possible Means of 
Effective Protection Is Fallacious and Limiting 
A belief that existing IPRs, on which sui generis solutions are based,  
provide the only avenue to protect cultural expressions is misleading and 
handicaps the goal of achieving effective protection for TCEs.  Intellectual 
property has been described as “nothing more than a socially-recognized, but 
imaginary, set of fences and gates” that “[p]eople must believe . . . for it to 
be effective.”137  Existing IPRs, which are based on Western intellectual 
property ideals, are so well established today that most of the world has 
accepted their set of defined “gates and fences.”  For instance, the 149 
member nations138 of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) have agreed to 
ensure that their laws conform to the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (“TRIPS”) agreement.139  The TRIPS agreement enforces 
the basic precepts of Western intellectual property protection, such as 
copyright, on all the member nations of the WTO.140  In essence, 149 nations 
have accepted Western intellectual property ideals and are in the process of 
implementing them.  Amid this widespread confirmation, it is easy to forget 
that existing IPRs are no more than one convention of protection, rather than 
the only possible convention.  It has been proposed that “the tradition which 
attracts the most adherence will be the one . . . [that] is the most 
persuasive.”141  Existing IPRs can thus be seen just a predominant paradigm 
of protection that most of the world has affirmed and considers persuasive.   
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Despite the widespread acceptance of existing IPRs, other regimes of 
protection based on different underlying philosophies continue to exist and 
may be better suited to protecting TCEs.  The application of the distinct 
indigenous customary laws of indigenous peoples for the protection of their 
particular TCEs is one such regime.  These laws have proved satisfactory to 
the indigenous groups that apply them and should be considered seriously.  
Ignoring other regimes and imposing predominantly Western-ideal based 
solutions upon cultures extraneous to those ideals does not allow for an 
accounting of the differences between the needs of the various cultures 
seeking protections.  Because many of these differences fall outside the 
scope of Western based regimes of protection, the protection achievable for 
TCEs remains limited.  Australia acknowledged the existence and 
applicability of indigenous customary laws in a significant way when it 
linked indigenous customs and laws with native land title.142  Moreover, 
while Australian courts are mindful of the existence of indigenous customary 
laws and have often taken them into account to varying degrees in their 
decisions, they continue to analyze the problem of protecting TCEs largely 
within the framework of existing IPRs.  For instance, the Ganalbingu clan’s 
claim was dismissed in Bulun Bulun because the clan had no applicable 
rights under existing IPRs.  Thus, the clan received no remedy despite 
having valid ownership of the artwork under indigenous customary law.  
One of the Justices of the High Court of Australia acknowledged these 
limitations: 
Difficulties with extending Australia’s intellectual property law 
to the styles and nuances of the artistic creations of Aboriginal 
and other indigenous people of Australia suggest that there may 
be a need to look specifically at the express adaptation of that 
law to the needs of indigenous peoples so that the law can 
respond to the problem and not simply impose its view of what 
the problem is upon all people uniformly.143 
Thus, the application of existing IPRs, and to a certain extent sui generis 
solutions based on them, to the protection of TCEs “imposes [a Western 
world] view of what the problem is upon all people uniformly”144 and thus, 
fails to respond with an effective solution. 
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B. Indigenous Customary Law Is Law and Constitutes a Satisfactory and 
Flexible Solution that Will Provide Effective Protection to TCEs 
Indigenous customary law refers to the “body of rules, values and 
traditions accepted in traditional . . . societies as establishing standards and 
procedures to be followed and upheld.”145  Indigenous peoples often have 
their own set of traditions and practices that have evolved over the years and 
constitute their customary law.146  Indigenous customary law transforms over 
time to account for the changes in the needs of the peoples it seeks to 
govern.147  It derives its legitimacy from social acceptance by the members 
of the community it governs148 and is based on norms that may be 
understood only by members of the community.149  Communities may 
possess institutional structures and mechanisms to implement and enforce 
their laws.150  Indigenous customary law is so entwined with the way of life 
of indigenous peoples, and is such an integral part of their culture, that it has, 
independent of the customs it governs, been claimed to be deserving of 
protection as an element of the culture.151  Indigenous customary law has 
also governed the use of TCEs in indigenous communities.  It determines 
who in the community is authorized to permit their use and reproduction.152  
Thus, indigenous customary law focuses on a “bundle of relationships rather 
than [the] bundle of economic rights,” which Western intellectual property 
laws emphasize.153  In addition, it focuses on community ownership and 
involvement rather than on personal rights.154  Under Aboriginal law in 
Australia, the right to use a clan’s symbols and stories resides in the 
traditional owners, who are considered custodians of the images.155  The 
traditional owners collectively determine whether and how the clan’s images 
can be used.156  Unfortunately, indigenous customary law is often viewed as 
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subordinate to other more prevalent legal traditions, and has not been 
accorded the legitimacy that those traditions enjoy. 157  
Indigenous customary law is law although it might not conform with 
Western notions of what constitutes law.158  Max Gluckman, a social 
anthropologist who has studied indigenous peoples, has found that systems 
of law do indeed exist in indigenous societies.159  While addressing the 
question of what law is, Gluckman argues that “we must accept that all 
words which deal with important social facts [such as law] are bound to have 
many meanings,” and that “it is sterile . . . to argue that such words can only 
be applied in one sense and not in another.”160  Therefore, law must be 
thought of more expansively than Western notions of what constitutes law.  
Law can be thought of as “the process of social control by which any society 
maintains order and discourages disorder.”161  Because indigenous 
customary law is a body of rules that establishes standards and procedures 
within a community,162 it is indeed law and has been recognized as such to a 
limited extent.  In European colonies, where native and European courts 
functioned in parallel, European courts applied native law in exceptional 
cases.163  The Australian High Court in Mabo recognized indigenous 
customary law and bolstered its significance by using it as a basis for land 
title.164   
Indigenous customary law has satisfactorily governed the use of 
TCEs, and is flexible enough to protect the diverse cultural expressions of 
indigenous communities around the world.  Indigenous customary law 
continues to exist today.  Various Australian court decisions can be found 
where questions relating to indigenous customary law have arisen.165  In 
some cases, such as Bulun Bulun and Yumbulul, claims based on indigenous 
customary law were even made.  However, because there are large numbers 
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of diverse indigenous groups across the world, no single indigenous position 
on the issue of folkloric protection exists.166  Hence, a single solution cannot 
ensue.  The application of community-specific indigenous customary law 
allows for a flexible solution that rejects the one-size-fits all approach.  
Australian courts have often struggled to understand the significance of 
TCEs to indigenous communities while attempting to fashion fair solutions.  
Misunderstandings about the needs of indigenous communities often result 
from efforts by outsiders to comprehend the role of TCEs in a community.167  
Because the principles underlying the protection of TCEs are embodied in 
the indigenous customary laws themselves, their application eliminates the 
possibility of misunderstandings that lead to ineffective solutions.  
Indigenous peoples have declared that “they want to create a system that is 
their own, and not a modification of ‘mainstream’ intellectual property 
law.”168  Indigenous people want to take control over their cultural 
expressions and define how these expressions can be used.169  The 
application of indigenous customary law will allow them to do so.170  It will 
also allow them to control the fate and development of their cultures, which 
has been argued to be the most effective way to counter forces that threaten 
to destroy the customary practices of indigenous peoples.171   
C. Mainstream Forms of Protection Are Sub-Optimal as They Are 
Founded Upon an Incompatible Western Intellectual Property 
Paradigm 
Existing IPRs and sui generis systems are rooted in Western concepts 
of intellectual property protection which are fundamentally distinct from the 
notions underlying the need for protecting TCEs.  This gap in the underlying 
precept for protection is magnified when an attempt is made to apply the 
fundamentally unsuitable IPRs and sui generis systems to TCEs.  It results in 
misaligned and inadequate solutions that over-reach or under-reach in the 
                                           
166
 See Angela A. Riley, Indigenous Peoples and the Promise of Globalization: An Essay on Rights 
and Responsibilities, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 155, 161 (2004). 
167
 See id. at 160. 
168
 Michael Halewood, Indigenous and Local Knowledge in International Law: A preface to Sui 
Generis Intellectual Property Protection, 44 MCGILL L.J. 953, 992 (1999). 
169
 See Christine Haight Farley, Protecting Folklore of Indigenous Peoples: Is Intellectual Property 
the Answer, 30 CONN. L.R. 1, 46-47 (1997) (referencing the Mataatua Declaration on Cultural and 
Intellectual Property Rights of Indigenous Peoples). 
170
 Global Intellectual Property Rights: Boundaries of Access and Enforcement, Panel II: The Law 
and Policy of Protecting Folklore, Traditional Knowledge, and Genetic Resources, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 753, 762-63 (2002). 
171
 Marina Hadjioannou, The International Human Right to Culture: Reclamation of the Cultural 
Identities of Indigenous Peoples Under International Law, 8 CHAP. L. REV. 201, 227 (2005). 
848 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 15 NO. 3 
 
 
types of protections they provide, as well as unintended consequences, 
which ultimately deny TCEs the protections required.  Such consequences 
cannot be rectified but for a realignment of the subject matter being 
protected and the regime used to protect it.   
1. The Western Intellectual Property Paradigm Is Fundamentally 
Incompatible with the Impetus to Protect TCEs 
Western notions of intellectual property protection that are deeply 
entrenched in existing IPRs and sui generis solutions are incompatible in 
significant ways with notions underlying the need to protect TCEs.172  In 
contrast with other traditions, western European culture, to which existing 
IPRs can trace their roots,173 has been thought of as materialistic and 
individualistic, placing a great emphasis on the consumption of goods and 
resources.174  Eurocentric societies have been identified with certain cultural 
attributes that are infused with this materialistic perspective and that color 
their thought processes and epistemological values and logic.175  Some 
attributes stemming from the Eurocentric perspective that may be at odds 
with the cultures of indigenous peoples include analytical thought, 
objectification, abstraction, extreme rationalism, and desacralization.176  
Eurocentricity is thought to delineate all the outputs of Eurocentric culture, 
including the arts, sciences, and even the society’s concept of the law.177  
Western notions of intellectual property, anchored in these epistemic 
frameworks, provide incentives for the progress of the arts and sciences, and 
for the commercialization and dissemination of intellectual works for the 
benefit of society.  In essence, they are “based on a capitalistic philosophy 
designed to serve a market economy.”178  The very idea that intellectual 
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creations are deserving of individualistic protections akin to property is a 
Western world view.179  In fact, the use of the term “intellectual property” to 
refer to the culture of indigenous peoples has significant implications 
because it requires their culture to be reduced to a list of features, as opposed 
to the flourishing and evolving creature that it is.180 
There is a chasm between these Western Eurocentric notions that 
underline existing IPRs and the notions underlying the need to protect TCEs.  
Indigenous societies are built on community-based economies that focus on 
collective creations that do not inherit a corresponding right of 
alienability.181  One Aboriginal Australian artist, whose artwork was 
reproduced without the requisite permission of the clan explained, “[i]t’s like 
the Queen and the monarchy.  They have their symbols and uniforms and 
[they are] passed down through one line of the family.  It doesn’t go 
anywhere else.  That is what Aboriginal art is about.”182  Indigenous peoples 
do not believe that consumerism will ultimately benefit humanity.183  The 
incentives and rewards of Eurocentric societies do not hold much value 
within indigenous culture.184  To indigenous peoples, TCEs are not an art or 
a science to be shared or disseminated, but an integral part of daily life with 
specified functions.  No incentive is required for their creation.  Mr. Bulun 
Bulun explained, “[m]y ancestors had a responsibility given to them by 
Baranda [the creator ancestor] to perform the ceremony and to do the 
paintings which were granted to them.  This is part of the continuing 
responsibility of the traditional Aboriginal owners handed down from 
generation to generation.”185  Until recently, TCEs were not commercially 
valuable; and even if opportunities for commercial exploitation cease, their 
creation will continue.  Their inherent value to indigenous communities is in 
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their creation and existence.  Therefore, a scheme of protection rooted in 
providing incentives to create and disseminate is inapplicable to TCEs.    
Similarly, sui generis systems, though more expansive in the 
protections they avail TCEs, were developed with reference to existing IPRs, 
and as a result, have inherent shortcomings as well.  The approach to the 
creation of sui generis systems can be seen as an effort to patch the holes 
exposed when attempts were made to apply existing IPRs to TCEs.  Such a 
reactionary tactic, meant to address the inadequacies of exiting IPRs, can 
hardly result in the most suitable form of protection for TCEs.  Ideally, 
protection should stem from a proactive, comprehensive evaluation of the 
particular needs of a group of people, notwithstanding the existence of other 
regimes, including possibly conflicting ones.   
A brief examination of some of the sui generis systems in existence 
today illustrates their shortfalls.  The Panama Law, hailed as a possible 
model for protection,186 only covers subject matter capable of commercial 
use.187  For example, the rights do not apply when national TCEs are used by 
public entities for non-commercial purposes.188  Thus, the needs of TCEs 
that have no commercial use, but significance to the communities that need 
protection, are not provided for by the law.  In addition, the Panama Law 
requires registration of TCEs,189 which can defeat the purpose of protection, 
especially with regard to expressions that are sacred or secret.  The Bangui 
Agreement allows the author to be the first holder of economic and moral 
rights, and provides for certain collaborative and collective works, yet fails 
to incorporate provisions dealing with needs specific to TCEs.190  The Model 
Provisions provide for fair use type exceptions.  They do not require 
authorization to use works for educational purposes, illustrations in original 
works, where TCEs are “borrowed” to create an original work, and other 
“incidental utilizations.”191  Such exceptions are very valuable within the 
context of existing IPRs.  However, the provisions can easily defeat the 
purpose of protection with regard to certain expressions, especially those 
that are sacred or secret.  The South Pacific Model Law too provides for fair 
use type exceptions and therefore, it has similar shortcomings.192 
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2. The Protections Needed for TCEs Cannot Be Addressed by Solutions 
Based on Western Intellectual Property Ideals Due to Fundamental 
Gaps in the Paradigms of Protection 
The fundamental principles underlying existing IPRs and sui generis 
solutions are not expansive enough to encompass the protections needed for  
TCEs, and consequently, both solutions fall short of providing the necessary 
level of protection.  Western intellectual property notions are rooted in ideas 
based on economic benefit and commercialization.  Solutions based on such 
concepts cannot capture the cultural significance inherent in the need to 
protect TCEs and fail to guarantee systems of cultural perpetuation.193  The 
aim of these solutions is misplaced at times and they often miss their mark.  
This is not surprising given that concepts such as the protection of sacred 
information do not exist in Western intellectual property laws.  In Yumbulul 
v. Reserve Bank,194 copyright law could not prevent a person outside the 
indigenous community from reproducing a sacred Morning Star pole or from 
using ideas based on traditional designs.195  Copyright law does not protect 
ideas, and yet the ideas sought to be protected were sacred to the clan and 
deserving of protection under indigenous customary law.  Thus, solutions 
based on Western intellectual property ideals cannot account for the various 
unique aspects of TCEs when compared with other types of expressions, and 
they fall short of providing TCEs with the necessary protections.   
3. Mismatched Paradigms of Protection Cause Solutions Based on 
Western Intellectual Property Ideals to Impose Unnecessary 
Requirements on TCEs, Further Limiting the Protections Available 
Gaps in the bases underlying existing IPRs and sui generis solutions 
on the one hand and TCEs on the other hand lead to an imposition of 
extraneous and unnecessary requirements for the protection of TCEs, which 
are ultimately counter productive.  The cultural developments in Europe that 
influenced the development of law are not so universal and transcendent that 
the law can be lifted out of context and applied successfully to the diverse 
cultural traditions of indigenous peoples around the world.196  Yet, Western 
legal requirements are applied to TCEs.  The result is that TCEs are often 
denied protection because they fail to meet the requirements imposed by the 
extrinsic laws, such as the requirements of authorship, originality, or fixation 
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under copyright law.  These requirements are not imposed by the indigenous 
peoples themselves and are inconsequential to the type of protection they 
desire.  Imposing such requirements only leads to the denial of protection of 
TCEs.  For instance, Mr. Bulun Bulun’s clan was denied an equitable interest 
in his painting because under Australian law, equitable interest can be gained 
only through joint authorship “defined as a collaboration ‘in which the 
contribution of each author is not separate from the contribution of the other 
author.’”197  In precluding clan ownership, the court stated that “[a] person 
who supplies an artistic idea to an artist who then executes the work is not, 
on that ground alone, a joint author with the artist.  Joint authorship 
envisages the contribution of skill and labour to the production of the work 
itself.”198  Thus, authorship, as defined by extraneous Australian copyright 
law, obstructed the court from providing relief to the clan which owned the 
images under indigenous customary law.  If TCEs are being protected for the 
benefit of indigenous communities, then they should be protected in the 
manner those communities desire.  Why then the need for extraneous 
requirements?   
In addition, efforts to satisfy extraneous requirements sometimes lead 
to unintended consequences that defeat the goal of adequately protecting 
TCEs.  The creation of public databases199 containing protected information 
is being considered to meet the requirement of notice—a Western legal 
construct.  These databases make public the secret and sacred information 
contained within them.  Consequently, their existence leads to a 
contemporaneous combustion of the sanctity of the information they seek to 
protect, thereby defeating their purpose.  Indigenous rights advocates have 
called such processes “entirely wrong headed”—and appropriately so.200 
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VI. CHALLENGES TO EXECUTING AN EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
INDIGENOUS CUSTOMARY LAW ARE SURMOUNTABLE 
The adoption of customary law as the mechanism for the protection of 
TCEs does pose certain challenges; nevertheless, they are not 
insurmountable.  The greatest objection to the use of indigenous customary 
law concerns the challenges of achieving effective implementation.  
However, implementation-related obstacles are not particular to indigenous 
customary laws, and exist with other solutions as well.  In fact, the 
challenges posed are no more difficult to surmount than those posed by other 
proposed regimes.  A genuine desire to adopt indigenous customary laws and 
the political will to do so can lead to effective implementation.   
A. Challenges to Executing an Effective Implementation of Indigenous 
Customary Law Exist but They Are No More Difficult to Surmount 
than Those Posed by Other Proposed Solutions 
The effective implementation of indigenous customary law for the 
protection of TCEs will face challenges; however, the challenges are at most 
different, if not identical to, those posed by other proposed solutions, and not 
necessarily more difficult to overcome.  First, in order to comply with 
indigenous customary laws, outsiders will need to ascertain the laws, which 
may pose a challenge.  However, certain sui generis solutions incorporate 
aspects of indigenous customary laws and there too, an understanding of the 
group’s laws is required.   
A similar problem is presented with existing IPRs where, even outside 
the spectrum of TCEs, an understanding of the laws is necessary and yet, is 
not always achieved.  Altering the scheme of protection to be based on 
indigenous customary law simply reverses which group of people will need 
to strive to understand the laws.  Given that the intent of the law is to protect 
the TCEs of indigenous peoples, it is not unfair to ask outsiders to carry 
some of the burden of protection.  Hence, the first challenge nets out when 
compared to the other proposed solutions. 
A second potential challenge to the implementation of indigenous 
customary laws is that there is no means by which to enforce an international 
regime of acceptance.201  At present, because there is no mechanism under 
which indigenous customary law can be enforced internationally, it may 
simply become a regional or state-specific solution.  However, sui generis 
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regimes have suffered the same fate.202  Thus, the use of indigenous 
customary law at worst preserves the status quo when compared with sui 
generis solutions.   
A final potential challenge to the implementation of indigenous 
customary law concerns whether it will be applicable to individuals outside 
the indigenous community.  Since indigenous customary law is already 
incorporated in certain sui generis regimes, it is already applied in some 
form to those outside the indigenous community.  In addition, if unfamiliar 
indigenous customary law is applied to outsiders to protect TCEs, it is no 
different from applying unfamiliar existing IPRs to indigenous groups.  A 
concern about the applicability of indigenous customary laws to outsiders is 
not founded on any stronger a basis than a reciprocal concern about the 
application of existing IPRs to indigenous peoples. 
B. Indigenous Customary Law Can Be Effectively Implemented 
Despite the existing challenges, an effective implementation of 
indigenous customary law for the protection of TCEs can be attained.  First, 
solutions exist to educate outsiders about indigenous customary laws.  One 
illustrative mechanism would be to create a presumption that the use of 
TCEs by outsiders is unauthorized unless explicit authorization is granted by 
the community that owns the TCE.  Thus, a user of a TCE will only be 
expected to investigate the law particular to the use desired and will be 
relieved of learning about all potentially applicable indigenous customary 
laws.  For instance, in Australia, parties wishing to use Aboriginal art would 
have the burden of obtaining explicit authorization from the community to 
which the artwork belongs.  Thus, they will be in compliance with both the 
indigenous customary law, as well as Australian copyright law.  States can 
also create education programs to disseminate information about appropriate 
processes for the use of TCEs.  Such a prospect may seem unwieldy at first.  
However, its goal—achieving an understanding of indigenous customary 
laws—is identical to getting a layman to understand basic copyright laws, 
which is realistic and achievable.  In fact, it has been argued that a lot can be 
accomplished in this area through education and sensitization of people to 
the issues, because people are generally willing to do the right thing.203   
Second, the enforcement of indigenous customary laws across borders 
can be achieved through the addition of appropriate provisions to the 
applicable multinational agreements.  The TRIPS agreement, which covers a 
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broad range of intellectual property protections,204 permits states a certain 
degree of freedom to implement particular policies within their borders,205 
while still requiring them to meet certain agreed upon minimum 
standards.206  A failure to comply with the agreement can lead to sanctions 
by other states.207  An agreement similar to TRIPS, or a provision within 
TRIPS, which permits state-specific implementation of indigenous 
customary law while requiring that laws be respected across borders can 
solve the cross-border implementation problem.  Indigenous customary law 
can then be comprehended with a state’s laws, and jurisdiction can be gained 
within a state’s national courts.  The implementation of TRIPS is 
expensive.208  The implementation of indigenous customary laws within 
TRIPS, or through a TRIPS-like agreement, will potentially also be 
expensive.  Hence, the political will to achieve implementation will be 
necessary.  Yet if an effective solution is to be achieved, such an approach 
should be given serious consideration.  In addition, if indigenous customary 
laws can be imbued as the norm for protecting TCEs, then arguably their use 
can be deemed a part of customary international law, and will be 
enforceable.  Consequently, a genuine desire to protect TCEs through use of 
indigenous customary laws can lead to creative solutions that surmount 
perceived challenges. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Indigenous customary laws, when compared with existing IPRs and 
sui generis solutions, more effectively protect the TCEs of indigenous 
peoples and should be implemented.  Indigenous peoples have the right to 
“practice and revitalize their cultural traditions,” which includes the right to 
“maintain, protect and develop the past, present and future manifestations of 
their cultures.”209  Indigenous customary law is law, and it has effectively 
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protected the TCEs of indigenous communities.  It is fallacious and limiting 
to presume that existing IPRs, and the sui generis solutions based on them, 
encompass all possible solutions when other viable options such as 
indigenous customary laws exist.  Existing IPRs and sui generis solutions 
are based on a paradigm that is inapplicable to TCEs.  Hence, they either fail 
to encompass aspects of TCEs that should be protected, or impose needless 
requirements that burden the process of protection to the extent that 
protection is denied.   
Challenges to the implementation of indigenous customary laws exist, 
but they are not insurmountable and the solution itself should not be rejected 
because of them.  The challenges are either identical to, or no worse than 
those posed by existing IPRs or sui generis solutions.  Viable solutions to the 
challenges do exist, and can be implemented with a genuine desire to protect 
the TCEs of indigenous peoples. 
